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The  Jobless  Recovery: 
Does  It  Signal  a  New  Era 
of  Productivity-led  Growth? 
BY FAR  THE  MOST WIDELY  NOTED  and puzzling aspect of the current 
economic recovery is its failure  to create  jobs. While payroll employ- 
ment in seven previous recessions increased  a full 7 percent  in the first 
twenty-three  months  following the NBER business cycle trough, such 
employment increased by only 0.8 percent-just  over one-tenth as 
much-from March  1991  to March  1993.'  Part  of the explanation  of neg- 
ligible  job growth lies in the recovery's relatively slow pace of output 
growth, which has been little more than one-third  the usual postwar 
pace.2 
The remaining  part  of the  job puzzle stems from  the ebullient  perfor- 
mance  of productivity-that is, output  per hour  in the nonfarm  business 
sector-which  registered  a growth  rate of 3.2 percent in the four quar- 
ters ending  in 1992:4,  the most rapid  rate  recorded  in any similar  period 
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1. The seven previous  troughs  are  those  from  1949  to 1982,  with  the exception  of July, 
1980.  See Ritter  (1993). 
2. The  annual  growth  rate  of nonfarm  business  output  (Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  mea- 
sure)  was 2.42  percent  at an annual  rate  in the first  seven quarters  of the 1991-93  recovery, 
only 39  percent  of the 6.25  percent  annual  rate  achieved  in the first  seven quarters  of seven 
previous  postwar  recoveries  (including  all but  the abortive  1980-81  recovery). 
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for more than sixteen years.' The share of output growth accounted for 
by productivity  growth in the current  recovery is 112 percent, far ex- 
ceeding  the 47 percent  average  of the previous  postwar  recoveries  at the 
same  stage.4 For  any  given pace of output  growth,  more  rapid  productiv- 
ity growth by definition  implies less rapid  growth in labor input. This 
suggests  that  the recent  revival  in productivity  growth  may  be the key to 
understanding  the puzzling  absence ofjob creation  in the recovery. 
Productivity-led  growth  is nothing  but  good news. In the two decades 
ending  in mid-1992,  the nonfarm  business sector registered  an average 
annual  productivity  growth  rate of less than 1 percent:  0.85 percent, to 
be exact.5  Imagine  the benefits  to the economy if the recent good news 
on productivity  were to imply, as some have suggested, a doubling  in 
productivity  growth  to a rate of 1.7 percent over the next decade.6  For 
any given path of labor input, nonfarm  private business output in the 
year 2003 would be almost 9 percent  larger-some  $450  billion  more- 
allowing  that much more private  and/or  public spending.  Productivity- 
led growth  does not imply  ajobless recovery  in anything  but  the shortest 
run. Instead, any beneficial  shock to productivity  growth  sets the stage 
for lower inflation  that  enables  policymakers  to stimulate  output  growth 
sufficiently  to create  the same number  ofjobs that  would have occurred 
in the absence  of the shock. If thejobless character  of the 1991-93  recov- 
ery indeed  has been caused  by a benign  productivity  shock, then its  job- 
less character  implies that there has been too little stimulus  to output 
growth,  not that  a productivity  surge  must necessarily  rob the nation  of 
jobs. 
3. The 3.2 percent  four-quarter  rate  achieved  in 1992:4  was most  recently  exceeded  by 
a rate of 4.8 percent  in 1976:  1. The highest  rate achieved  in the previous  business  cycle 
was 4.8 percent  in 1973:1. 
4.  In  the  first  seven quarters  of the  recent  recovery,  the  annual  growth  rates  of nonfarm 
business output  and output  per hour were 2.42 and 2.71 percent,  respectively.  The un- 
weighted  averages  of seven previous  postwar  recoveries  were 6.25 and 2.94 percent,  re- 
spectively. 
5. This is the annual  growth  rate between 1972:2  and 1992:2.  When  the most recent 
two quarters  are included,  the growth  rate  rises to 0.92. The quarter  chosen for this com- 
parison,  1972:2,  is judged  to be a "cyclically  neutral"  quarter,  as discussed  in table  3. As I 
discuss below, weighting  problems  bias downward  the measured  rate of productivity 
growth  before 1987. 
6.  Stephen  S. Roach  of Morgan  Stanley  predicts  that  nonfarm  business productivity 
will  grow  at the  rate  of 1.7  to 1.8  percent  per  year  during  the 1990s.  See Sylvia  Nasar,  "U.S. 
Output  per  Worker  Is Growing:  Recent  Data  Show  Productivity  Is Up,"  New York  Times, 
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Alternative Interpretations: A New  Era versus the  Usual  Cyclical 
Rebound? 
This paper  takes a skeptical  view of the widely held belief that  a new 
era of faster productivity  growth  is at hand. Weighed  against  the innu- 
merable  tales of corporate  restructuring  and  downsizing  is a much  more 
pessimistic story told by the official data on productivity  growth over 
the last few years. 
THE  CASE  FOR A NEW  ERA.  The universal  theme of recent  commen- 
taries is that this recovery is unique  in the continuing  onslaught  of per- 
manentjob  terminations,  mainly  by large  corporations,  and  the apparent 
refusal  of employers  (large  and  small)  to hire  new employees. The  Econ- 
omist prompted  the title of this paper  when it argued, "America  is en- 
joying its first  productivity-led  recovery  for many  decades."7  Secretary 
of Labor Robert Reich has expressed concern about 'job gridlock."8 
Lawrence Mishel and Jared Bernstein have highlighted  the fact that 
roughly  three-quarters  of the rise in unemployment  in the early 1990s 
has been due to permanent  job loss, so that the absolute magnitude  of 
permanent  job loss has been as great  in this relatively  mild  recession as 
in the much  deeper 1981-82  recession.9  While  a productivity  surge  dur- 
ing  the recovery  is normal,  Stephen  S. Roach  has argued  "there  is reason 
to believe that  what's happening  this time is different. . . ajob shakeout 
that is an inevitable byproduct of market globalization."'0  The Wall 
Street Journal has heralded an "age of angst" and announced that a 
"workplace revolution boosts productivity at [the] cost  of job  se- 
curity." "1 
A particular  aspect of the recent  recovery  has been the disproportion- 
ate share  in corporate  layoffs of white-collar  workers  and of workers  in 
the service sector, in contrast to the decimation  of manufacturing  em- 
ployment and of the Rust Belt that characterized  employment  adjust- 
ments a decade ago. As Roach has argued,  "Corporate  America  can no 
7.  "America  the Super-fit,"  Economist,  February  13, 1993,  p. 67. 
8.  See  "Biggest Rise Since '72 for Productivity,"  Chicago Tribune, March 10, 
1993,  p. 3. 
9.  See Mishel  and  Bernstein  (1992,  p. 5). 
10. Stephen  S. Roach  as paraphrased  by Forbes. See "What's  Ahead  for Business," 
Forbes, March  1, 1993,  p. 37. 
11. G. Pascal  Zachary  and  Bob Ortega,  "Age  of Angst:  Workplace  Revolution  Boosts 
Productivity  at Cost of Job Security,"  Wall  Street  Journal,  March  10, 1993,  p. Al. 274  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
longer  afford  to subsidize  the bloat of unproductive  workers . . . These 
efficiency  breakthroughs  have taken  a steep toll on an entirely  new class 
of victims-white-collar workers.  White-collar  unemployment  now ex- 
ceeds blue-collar  joblessness by 200,000  workers, the first such gap on 
record."'12 
THE  OPPOSING  VIEW:  A  NORMAL  CYCLICAL  REBOUND.  Journalis- 
tic accounts focus on corporate  downsizing  of particular  firms  having 
unusual  problems,  such as IBM and Sears, and leave out the much less 
dramatic  humdrum  everyday  business of gains  in sales and  employment 
by their  competitors.  As American  Enterprise  Institute  economist  Mar- 
vin Kosters  has noted, "Sears  announcesjob  cutbacks.  Ever see any ref- 
erences to Wal-Mart  hiring  anyone?  I never  heard  of Microsoft  ever hir- 
ing a worker,  but they must  have."  13 
Moving from anecdotal evidence to the hard facts, journalistic  ac- 
counts have highlighted  only the heady numbers  of recent productivity 
performance  over the past four quarters  without  lingering  on the dismal 
performance  of the four years before that. In contrast to the long-run 
growth  rate  since 1972  of slightly  less than 1  percent  per year, the annual 
growth  rate  of nonfarm  private  productivity  recorded  for the four years 
ending  in 1991:4  was virtually  zero: 0.11 percent  per year, to be precise. 
The big boom  of 3.2 percent  for the following  four  quarters  only brought 
the rate  for the past five years up to 0.74 percent, still  below the 1972-87 
average. 
It is always tempting  to proclaim  a new era on the basis of a few 
months  or quarters  of macroeconomic  data.  Yet the productivity  record 
viewed over any period  longer  than  the last four quarters  displays  faint 
support  for a new era. Because the actual rate of productivity  growth 
achieved through  the end of 1992  over the past five years is below, not 
above, the lamentable  pace of 1972-87,  those claiming  that  the trend  rate 
has increased  must be assuming  that the actual level of productivity  in 
1992:4  was well below the new rapidly  growing  trend. Any assessment 
of the new era  approach  requires  a model  of the cyclical deviation  of pro- 
ductivity  from  trend  at each stage of the business cycle. What  is a plau- 
sible estimate of the deviation  of actual productivity  below its trend at 
12. Stephen  S. Roach, "The  New Majority:  White-Collar  Jobless,"  New York  Times, 
March  14, p. E17. 
13. Quoted  in Jerry  Flint, "Keep  a Resume  on the Floppy,  But Don't Panic,"  Forbes, 
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this stage of the business cycle? The econometric  analysis  of this paper 
provides  an answer  to this and  other  related  questions. 
Separating  Trend and Cycle 
At least since the early 1960s, when Thor  Hultgren14  and Arthur  M. 
Okun'5  published their analyses, macroeconomists  have known that 
productivity  exhibits procyclical fluctuations. Any evaluation of the 
long-term  productivity  performance  of the economy requires  that the 
underlying trend be  unscrambled from quarter-to-quarter  cyclical 
movements.  This task cannot  be achieved simply  by measuring  produc- 
tivity growth  between successive NBER-demarcated  cyclical peaks or 
between successive troughs,  for at least three  reasons. First, productiv- 
ity is a leading  indicator  and reaches its peak at a different  point in the 
cycle from  the official  National  Bureau  of Economic Research  (NBER) 
peak. Second, cycles are of different  durations  and amplitudes,  and so 
the relationship  of the productivity  peak to the NBER peak is variable, 
rather  than  fixed. Third,  the last stage  of the business cycle expansion  is 
marked  by a regular  phenomenon  that  I have previously  called the end- 
of-expansion  effect, the unusually  slow productivity  growth  that seems 
to occur in the last year or two before  the NBER peak.  16 
The importance  of separating  trend  from  cycle is motivated  by many 
considerations  in addition  to the natural  interest in whether the econ- 
omy's long-term  productivity  performance  has gotten better or worse. 
First, any evaluation  of past economic  policies, such as the effect of sup- 
ply-side tax cuts or R&D tax credits, requires  a measure  of their effect 
on cyclically adjusted  productivity  growth. Second, assessments of the 
performance  of political  eras, such  as the Eisenhower  era  or the Reagan- 
Bush era, must refer to productivity  purged  of purely cyclical effects. 
Finally,  estimates  of future  growth  in potential  output  (that  is, trend  pro- 
ductivity  plus trend  hours)  are needed to project  the federal  budget,  the 
likely  path  of unemployment,  and  even the inflationary  consequences  of 
alternative  monetary  policies. 
This paper's basic purpose is to develop a method for determining 
what information  about the underlying  trend is provided  by the latest 
14. Hultgren  (1960). 
15. Okun(1962). 
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data on actual productivity  movements. The second part begins with 
data  issues, which  play a surprisingly  important  role in assessing the va- 
lidity  of the interpretation  of a new era. The third  part  then assesses two 
alternative  detrending  techniques  and describes the data  on actual and 
trend movements in average  labor productivity  (ALP) and multifactor 
productivity  (MFP).  The fourth  part  sets out the specification  of a time- 
series regression equation that identifies the cyclical parameters  and 
also presents  the estimated  equations.  The fifth  part  then  provides  alter- 
native measures of the underlying  trend for 1987-92 that result in the 
best fit to the cyclical adjustment  model. The section also computes 
forecasts of productivity  growth  over the 1993-94  period.  The sixth and 
final  part  presents  conclusions. 
All the empirical  analysis is carried  out for three sectors-nonfarm 
business, manufacturing,  and the nonfarm  nonmanufacturing  business 
sector  (NFNM). While  historical  growth  rates  are displayed  for both av- 
erage labor  productivity  and multifactor  productivity,  the econometric 
analysis  concentrates  entirely  on average  labor  productivity. 
Data and Detrending 
There are three official sources of data on productivity  for the U.S. 
economy. Annual data on gross product originating  (that is,  value 
added)  and hours worked  are part  of the National  Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA).  17 Unfortunately,  the NIPA data  for output  by indus- 
try  are not currently  available  after 1989.  The Bureau  of Labor  Statistics 
(BLS) provides  data  on gross output,  employment,  and (in some cases) 
hours  worked  for a long list of industries  in both the manufacturing  and 
nonmanufacturing  sectors;  these are  available  through  1990  (or, in some 
cases, 1991).  But the BLS provides no aggregates  corresponding  to its 
industry-by-industry  measures. Both the NIPA and BLS industry  mea- 
sures share a defect; they are available  only annually  and thus are not 
suitable  for a study  of high-frequency  time-series  dynamics. 
17. Hours worked  are provided  for major  industrial  sectors at roughly  the one-digit 
level (NIPA  table  6.11), while  output  (table  6.2) and  persons  engaged  (table  6. lOb)  are  pro- 
vided  for  a much  longer  list of two-digit  industries.  Table  numbers  refer  to those using  1982 
as the base year. Robert  J. Gordon  277 
Thus  by default  this study  uses the third  data  source  based  on  Produc- 
tivity and Costs,  the BLS quarterly  series on output  and hours worked 
in the private nonfarm  economy and in manufacturing.  The BLS also 
publishes  annual  series for these two sectors on capital  input  and capi- 
tal's income share-required ingredients  in computing  its annual  mea- 
sures  of MFP. Here I interpolate  the capital  input  and  income share  data 
from  the annual  to the quarterly  frequency  (using  overlapping  four-quar- 
ter moving  averages)  in order  to compute  a quarterly  series on MFP  for 
each sector. 
While the BLS does not publish series for the NFNM sector, these 
can be calculated as a residual. I calculate NFNM by multiplying  the 
BLS index numbers  for the aggregate  series and for manufacturing  by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) absolute levels of output, 
hours, and  capital  input  in 1982.  The NFNM totals are then obtained  by 
subtraction  and are converted  back to index numbers. 
The  underlying  source  for the BLS output  measure  in the private  non- 
farm  sector  is the NIPA quarterly  series on GDP, minus  general  govern- 
ment, farm  output, output  of nonprofit  institutions,  output  of paid em- 
ployees of private households, the rental value of owner-occupied 
dwellings,  and the statistical  discrepancy.  The hours data are obtained 
from  the monthly  payroll  employment  survey, combined  with hours  per 
employee  from  the BLS hours  at work survey. Adjustments  are made  to 
exclude  from  labor  input  the same sectors that  are subtracted  from  GDP 
in obtaining  the output  series. The annual  capital  input  and  capital  share 
are recomputed  by the BLS from  BEA data. 
To obtain quarterly  data on manufacturing  output, the BLS takes 
quarterly  movements  in the Federal  Reserve  Index  of Industrial  Produc- 
tion (IIP)  and adjusts  these to the annual  manufacturing  output  levels in 
the NIPA. Because the NIPA do not yet include  annual  series on manu- 
facturing  output for the period after 1989, the BLS extrapolates the 
NIPA output  series with the IIP. 
Data  Issues 
By far  the most important  data  issue for the results  of this paper  is the 
so-called  base-year  weighting  bias. This  bias  understates  the growth  rate 
of productivity  before 1987. This substantially  raises the hurdle  to be 
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because the economy's productivity  performance  during  the slowdown 
from 1972  to 1987  was substantially  better than is indicated  by the cur- 
rently  published  official  data. 
THE  BASE-YEAR  WEIGHTING  BIAS.  The  BLS  output data used  in 
this paper  for the aggregate  economy (that  is, the nonfarm  business sec- 
tor) reflect the rebasing  of output deflators  from 1982  to 1987 prices. 
While  the BEA has not yet published  manufacturing  output  data  for the 
1987  base year, it has prepared  for the BLS productivity  program  an un- 
published series of revised 1987-weighted  manufacturing  output data 
covering  1977-89.18  Thus  the BLS output  data  used in this  paper  provide 
a consistent treatment  of the aggregate  economy and of manufacturing, 
which allows nonfarm  nonmanufacturing  output  to be extracted  as a re- 
sidual. 
However, as is well known, output measures based on the fixed 
weights of a single year lead to a systematic bias: for products  such as 
computers  with a rapidly  declining  relative  price, the share  of output  in 
higher aggregates  (such as manufacturing,  producers' durable equip- 
ment, and  GDP)  will be exaggerated  in each year  after  the base year and 
understated  in each year before the base year. The base-year  bias cor- 
respondingly  causes the annual  growth  rate of output  and of productiv- 
ity to be understated  in each year prior  to the base year and overstated 
in each year after  the base year. 
Table 1 summarizes  what is known about the base-year bias in the 
BEA output  series  for the aggregate  economy  for the 1959-90  period  and 
for manufacturing  during  the 1977-87  period. Bias is measured  here by 
the difference  between  the data  based  on 1987  weights  and  on data  calcu- 
lated using BEA's benchmark-year  series. The latter  is based on a geo- 
metric  mean  of indexes from succeeding  BEA benchmark  years, which 
are five years apart.  '9 I have supplemented  published  BEA estimates  of 
the base-year  bias  by providing  an estimate  of the manufacturing  bias  for 
1972-77, derived the implied  base-year  bias for nonfarm  nonmanufac- 
turing  for 1972-87, and then applied  these bias figures  to the published 
18. I am grateful  to Michael  Harper  for providing  me with a BLS press release  dated 
March  26, 1992,  that describes  the special BEA series on manufacturing  output  used by 
the BLS productivity  program. 
19. See Young (1992)  for more detailed  information  about fixed-weight  and bench- 
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Table 1. Effect  of Alternative  Weighting  Systems  on Aggregate  and Sectoral 
Productivity,  1959-90 
Percent per year 
Output  per houir 
Outpuit  Implied 
Fixed  Benich-  Fixed  bench- 
1987  mark-  1987  mark- 
weights  years  Difference  weights  years 
Sector  Period  index  index  (bias)  index  indexa 
Aggregate  1959-72  3.7  4.1  0.4  2.4  2.8 
economy  1972-77  2.6  2.9  0.3  1.3  1.6 
1977-87  2.6  2.9  0.3  0.7  1.0 
1987-90  2.5  2.4  -0.1  0.0  -0.1 
Manufacturing  1972-77  2.8  3.8c  Loc  2.5  3.5 
1977-87  1.6  2.6  1.0  1.8  2.8 
Nonmanufacturingb  1972-77  2.9  2.8c  _0.1c  0.8  0.7 
1977-87  3.1  3.2  0.1  0.2  0.3 
Source: Author's  calculations  using  the following  sources. Aggregate  economy  refers  to real GDP, from  Young 
(1992,  table  A, p. 36). Manufacturing  for 1972-77  is estimated  as described  in note b below. Manufacturing  for 1977- 
87 is also from  Young  (1992,  exhibit  1, p. 34). The 1982  values  of manufacturing  real  GDP  are  obtained  from  Suirvey 
of Currenit  Buisiniess  (January  1991,  table  6, p. 34);  values  for  other  years  are  obtained  by multiplying  the BLS output 
series  (expressed  as an index  with 1982  =  1.0)  by the 1982  values.  Output  per hour  for manufacturing  was obtained 
from Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  Productivity  and Costs, various  issues, as described  in the text. Hours  data for 
manufacturing  are from  Slrvey of Cuirrent  Business,  table  6.11, various  issues, using 1982  as the base year. 
a. The implied  benchmark-years  index  for productivity  is the sum of the fixed 1987  weights  index  for output  per 
hour  plus the bias in output  between  the fixed  weight  and benchmark  years  indexes. 
b. Nonmanufacturing  output  is aggregate  real  GDP  minus  manufacturing  real  GDP. 
c.  Manufacturing  output  data  for 1972-77  have not been published  with 1987  fixed  weights  and  are available  only 
with 1982  fixed  weights.  The problem  is to estimate  the base-year  bias for 1972-77  with 1982  fixed weights.  This is 
the same number  of years  prior  to the base year  as 1977-82  with 1987  fixed  weights,  for which  Young  (1992,  exhibit 
1, p. 34) provides  an estimated  base-year  bias of 1.4 percentage  points  per year. To be conservative,  and because 
computers  are less important  in earlier  years, these 1.4 percentage  points  are reduced  to the 1.0 percentage  point 
bias shown  in the third  output  column  labeled  "Difference"  for manufacturing  during  1972-77. 
growth rates of the BLS series on output per hour. For the aggregate 
economy, productivity  growth  is understated  by about 0.3 percent per 
year during 1959-87 and is overstated by 0.1 percent per year during 
1987-90.  Manufacturing  productivity  growth  is overstated  during  1972- 
87 by a much  larger  1.0 percent  per year, while there  appears  to be little 
if any bias in nonmanufacturing  productivity  growth. 
While  no estimate  is available  of the base-year  bias  for manufacturing 
after 1987,  one would assume that it might  be relatively  large  for 1987- 
92, the first  five years after  the base year. The best guess that might  pin 
down the approximate  size of the bias comes from the BEA's estimate 
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is overstated  by 0.8 percent per year.20  However, a mitigating  factor is 
that the BEA has not calculated  manufacturing  output after 1989, and 
instead  the BLS extrapolates  the 1989-92  values using the IIP, which is 
not subject  to the same type of base-year  bias. 
IIP  USE  OF  EMPLOYMENT  DATA.  Monthly changes in the IIP are 
partly  based  on employment  data.  To the extent that  productivity  is pro- 
cyclical, output  measures  based on the IIP will understate  the degree  of 
cyclicality. Assuming  that quarterly  fluctuations  in GDP are accurate, 
the use of IIP to create the manufacturing  output series leads to an un- 
derstatement  of the procyclicality  in manufacturing  productivity  and  the 
opposite  bias  for NFNM productivity,  because  the latter  is calculated  as 
a residual.  More  generally,  the calculation  of NFNM data as a residual 
will lead to measurement  errors  that go in the opposite direction  from 
errors  in the manufacturing  data. However, because the NFNM sector 
is three times larger  than  the manufacturing  sector in absolute  size, any 
such measurement  errors  in  percentage change data for NFNM will be 
one-third  the size of the corresponding  errors  in manufacturing. 
PAYROLL  EMPLOYMENT  VERSUS  HOUSEHOLD  EMPLOYMENT.  As 
indicated  in the introduction,  payroll  employment  stagnated  during  the 
1991-93  recovery, with growth  between March  1991  and March  1993  of 
only 0.8 percent. This contrasts with growth of 1.5 percent-almost 
twice as fast-in  civilian  employment  from the household survey. This 
contrast  appears  to be a normal  feature  of business  cycles.21  A more  con- 
vincing hint that the payroll employment  numbers  grow too slowly is 
provided  by the discrepancy  between  the national  total  published  by the 
BLS and the sum of estimates issued by individual  states. By one esti- 
mate, this discrepancy  could lead to a subsequent  upward  revision to 
payroll  employment  of as much  as 0.7 percent.22 
20. Young  (1992,  exhibit  1, p. 34). 
21. To assess the normal  cyclical  fluctuations  in the ratio  of civilian  household  to non- 
farm  payroll  employment,  this ratio  was regressed  in annual  data  for 1972-92  on a con- 
stant,  a trend,  one lagged  value  of the dependent  variable,  and  the current  and  one lagged 
value of the unemployment  gap (the actual  unemployment  rate  minus  my estimate  of the 
natural  unemployment  rate).  The residual  for 1992  is close to zero and  less than  half  of the 
standard  error  of the equation. 
22. See Gene Koretz "New Numbers  Are Brightening  the Employment  Outlook," 
Business Week,  May 3, p. 22. Koretz reported  that the growth  from September  1991  to 
January  1993  of the national  payroll  employment  estimate  was 0.5 percent  and  the sum  of 
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Detrending 
The basic question  addressed  by this paper  is whether  the underlying 
trend of average labor productivity has accelerated in recent years. 
Much  recent  empirical  work  in macroeconomics  uses the Hodrick-Pres- 
cott filter,  which  allows  the trend  to move continuously.23  The trend  that 
emerges  from the H-P filter  calculation  depends  on the user's choice of 
a smoothness  parameter.  At one extreme, the choice of a parameter  of 
zero yields a trend  that  exactly tracks  every value of the series being  de- 
trended. At the other extreme, a parameter  of infinity  yields a single 
straight  loglinear  trend.  Between zero and  infinity,  a relatively  low value 
for the smoothness parameter  creates a trend series that bends fre- 
quently  in response  to changes  in the actual  series and  hence implies  rel- 
atively small  deviations  from  trend;  a high  parameter  value  creates  a rel- 
atively smooth trend and relatively larger  deviations from trend. The 
parameter  endorsed by Hodrick and Prescott is a relatively  low value 
(1,600)  that  implies  implausibly  large  accelerations  and  decelerations  of 
the trend  within  each business cycle.24 
Table 2 compares  actual growth  rates of average labor  productivity 
for three periods-1972-87,  1987-90, and 1990-92-with  computed 
H-P trends  for ALP, using  five alternative  values of the smoothness  pa- 
rameter.  This comparison  is displayed  from  the top to the bottom  of ta- 
ble 2 for the three sectors (nonfarm business, manufacturing,  and 
NFNM). As would  be expected, the coherence  of the H-P  trend  with  the 
growth rates of the actual values is greatest for the lowest numerical 
23. Hodrick  and  Prescott  (1981). 
24. Hodrick  and Prescott (1981, pp. 5-8) provide  a justification  of a value for their 
smoothness  parameter  of 1,600,  and  this has been used in their  subsequent  work  (such  as 
Prescott,  1986)  and  the  work  of most  other  H-P  users.  Yet this  justification  is based  entirely 
on a subjective  statement:  "Our  prior  view  is that  a five  percent  cyclical  component  is mod- 
erately  large  as is a one-eighth  of one percent  change  in the growth  rate  in a quarter.  This 
led us to select  K = 5/(1/8) = 40 or A =  1,600  as a value  for the smoothing  parameter." 
To interpret  their  prior,  consider  the Great  Depression  of 1929-33  (when  real  GDP  fell 34 
percent  below a 2.5 percent  per year log-linear  trend  extending  from 1928  to 1948).  One 
can multiply  their  example  of 5/(1/8)  by 5, for a cyclical component  of 25 percent  and a 
reduction  in the growth  trend  of 5/8 percent  per quarter  or 2.5 percent  per year. Thus in 
their  interpretation,  the computed  trend  had zero growth  between 1929  and 1933  despite 
continued  growth  in the working-age  population  and  in the productivity  that  would  have 
been observed  at a constant  unemployment  rate. 282  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Table 2.  Trend Growth Rates of Labor Productivity Using Hodrick-Prescott Filter 
Sector  Smoothness  parameter  1972.2-1987:3 1987:3-1990:3  1990:3-1992:4 
Nonfarm business  None  (actual values)  0.99  -0.23  1.95 
400  0.96  0.21  1.01 
1,600  0.95  0.45  0.66 
6,400  0.93  0.62  0.59 
25,600  0.93  0.68  0.62 
102,400  0.97  0.66  0.60 
Manufacturing  None  (actual values)  2.13  2.49  2.31 
400  2.07  2.37  2.34 
1,600  2.07  2.53  2.31 
6,400  2.04  2.66  2.47 
25,600  2.05  2.60  2.49 
102,400  2.11  2.36  2.28 
Nonfarm  None  (actual values)  0.48  -  1.10  1.86 
nonmanufacturing  400  0.23  -  0.35  0.60 
business  1,600  0.20  -0.10  0.20 
6,400  0.16  0.06  0.11 
25,600  0.17  0.09  0.10 
102,400  0.24  0.04  0.04 
Source: Based  on author's  calculations  using  five alternative  values  of a smoothness  parameter  for the Hodrick- 
Prescott  filter  as described  in the text. Actual  data are taken from Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  Productivity  and 
Costs, various  issues. 
value of the smoothness parameter.  As the smoothness parameter  in- 
creases, the computed  trend is equalized across the three subperiods. 
Despite  these patterns,  the choice of the smoothness  parameter  does not 
appear  to make  much  difference;  for the nonfarm  business sector in the 
top section of the table, any parameter  of 1,600  or more yields a trend 
for 1990-92  of only 0.6 percent  at most-well  below the 0.99 percent  ac- 
tual  rate  recorded  from 1972-87.  In the NFNM sector, the H-P trends  of 
around  0.1 percent  per year are also well below the actual 1972-87  rate 
of 0.48 percent. Only  in manufacturing  is there  a post-  1987  acceleration, 
and  here the actual  value grows so smoothly  that  all the alternative  H-P 
trends  grow at a rate  roughly  similar  to that  of the actual  value. 
Figure 1 displays one of the computed H-P trends for the nonfarm 
business sector (this series assumes a smoothness  parameter  of 25,600) 
and compares  it with the actual values over the 1972-92 period. Note 
that  the actual  value in late 1992  rises well above the H-P trend,  in con- 
trast  to the 1983-84  recovery when the actual  value did not significantly 
exceed the trend. This contrast  suggests that the computed  H-P trends 
for the recent  period  may grow too slowly. But figure  1 also illustrates  a Robert J. Gordon  283 
Figure  1. Labor  Productivity  and H-P Trend  for Nonfarm  Businessa 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  based on Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Productivity  and Costs,  various  issues. 
a.  The H-P (Hodrick-Prescott)  smoothness  parameter is set to 25,600. 
basic dilemma  in assessing the recent episode. Because actual  produc- 
tivity growth  was so slow over the 1987-91  period,  almost  any trend  line 
must  interpret  much  or all of the 1992  acceleration  as simply  a catchup, 
rather  than representing  the beginning  of a new faster trend. The 1992 
acceleration  has not yet lasted long enough  to provide  reliable  evidence 
that the trend has accelerated relative to the 1972-87 growth rate of 
about 1 percent  per year (as measured  by the official 1987-fixed-weight 
data, or 1.3  percent  with the alternative  benchmark-weighted  data). 
The alternative  detrending  technique  used in the rest of this paper  is 
to draw piecewise loglinear  trends through  selected benchmark  quar- 
ters. This technique  has the advantage  that it can use outside informa- 
tion  on variables  other  than  the one being  detrended-for example, such 
variables  as unemployment  and the capacity utilization  rate-to  select 
benchmark  quarters  having similar  cyclical characteristics.25  A further 
advantage  of piecewise trends is that there is one trend per business 
cycle, thus achieving a clean break between the business cycle fre- 
25. In contrast, the univariate  H-P technique  ignores outside information.  For in- 
stance,  using  the same  smoothness  parameter  as that  recommended  by Hodrick  and  Pres- 
cott (1,600),  Finn  E. Kydland  and  Edward  C. Prescott  (1990,  chart  2, p. 9) illustrate  the log 
levels of actual  and trend  real  GNP and show that  almost  the entire  boom of the 1960s  is 
interpreted  as an acceleration  of the trend, rather  than a deviation  of actual  above the 
trend.  This  ignores  outside  information,  such  as the  fact the that  the unemployment  rate  in 
the mid-  1960s  was unusually  low and  that  the capacity  utilization  rate  was unusually  high. 284  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
Figure 2.  Productivity in Nonfarm Businessa 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  based on  Bureau of  Labor Statistics,  Productivity  and  Costs,  various  issues.  See 
the text  for more details on source  information and for an explanation  of the author's  methodology. 
a.  Vertical bars designate end-of-expansion  intervals. The solid line represents the growth cycle  peak when output 
reaches  its  highest  level  relative  to trend or potential  output.  The  dashed  line  represents  the  NBER-dated  output 
cycle  peak, except  for the line for 1974:2, when the NBER  peak was dated as occurring in 1973:4. 
quency represented  by deviations  from trend  and the lower frequency 
changes  in the trend  from  one business cycle to the next. 
The business cycle in productivity  differs  from  that  in output. Figure 
2 shows two measures  of productivity  and the dating  of the expansion 
effects. Note that by this dating, productivity  leads the output cycle, 
which is marked  by the dashed  vertical  lines that  identify  NBER peaks. 
Productivity  tends to reach its peak relative to trend when output is 
growing  most rapidly.  Further,  productivity  tends to perform  poorly at 
the end of expansions. These observations suggest that benchmark 
quarters  should be chosen by three criteria:  to maintain  roughly the 
same level of utilization  of resources across cycles; to choose points at 
which the growth characteristics  of output are roughly  similar;  and to 
exclude end-of-expansion  periods. Six benchmark  quarters  that meet 
these criteria are displayed in table 3. Note that I exclude the short 
business cycles containing  the incomplete recoveries of 1958-59 and 
1980-8  1. 
For the remaining  six cycles, I choose quarters  in which the unem- 
ployment  rate was roughly  equal  to the natural  rate  identified  in my pre- 
vious research  on inflation.26  Two such quarters  occur  in each cycle: one 
when unemployment  is falling  and another  when unemployment  is ris- 
26. For  example,  see Gordon  (1982). Robert J. Gordon  285 
Table  3. Selected  Variables  in Benchmark  Quarters 
Business 
cycle  Capacity  Gordon 
(peak to  Quarter  Unemploy-  utilization  output 
peak)  selecteda  ment rate  rate  ratiob 
1948-53  1950:2  5.6  77.9  100.2 
1953-57  1954:4  5.3  79.7  100.1 
1957-60  excluded  ...  ...  ... 
1960-69  1963:3  5.5  83.6  100.0 
1969-73  1972:2  5.7  82.0  101.1 
1973-80  1978:3  6.0  85.1  101.0 
1980-81  excluded  ...  ...  ... 
1981-90  1987:3  6.0  80.2  100.0 
Source:  Unemployment  rate  is  from  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Employmlent and  Earniings, various  issues. 
Capacity utilization rate is from Federal Reserve Bulletini, various issues.  Gordon output ratio is from Gordon (1993, 
appendix table A-2). 
a.  Cfiteria for selection  are as follows:  the unemployment  rate,  U,,  is as close  as possible  to the natural rate of 
unemployment  as calculated  in Gordon (1993, appendix  table A-2); the unemployment  rate is falling; and the end- 
of-expansion  effect  dummy is nonoperative  (Dk =  0 in equation  I of the text). 
b.  The output ratio is the ratio of actual to natural output. 
ing. I chose  the former quarter; hence  my benchmark quarters tend to 
be periods when output is rising relatively fast and thus productivity is 
relatively high. As a result, actual productivity is below trend on average 
over the postwar period. Table 3 also presents two other cyclical indica- 
tors, the Federal Reserve capacity utilization rate and the ratio of actual 
to natural output as calculated from my past research.  Because  unem- 
ployment  is currently well  above  the natural rate of about 6 percent, 
there is no benchmark quarter to establish the trend for the period since 
1987. Determination of the post-1987 trend is the task of the final part of 
this paper. 
The Historical  Behavior  of Productivity 
Now  equipped with a consistent  set of benchmark quarters, one can 
examine plots of actual data and trends in the official data (ignoring for 
now the effects  of the  1987 base-year  weighting bias).  The actual and 
trend values of ALP and MFP are shown for the three sectors in figures 
2, 3, and 4. The post- 1987 trends are omitted, and for ALP, will be deter- 
mined in the final part below.  (The paper does not discuss the post-1987 
trend of MFP.) The solid vertical lines in the figures mark off the end-of- 
expansion periods highlighted in the regression analysis below. 286  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Figure 3.  Productivity in Manufacturinga 
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Several  facts about  the nonfarm  business sector stand  out in figure  2. 
The ALP trend  decelerates  after 1972  and  decelerates  further  after 1978, 
indicating that the secular productivity slowdown worsened in the 
1980s.  The end-of-expansion  periods marked  by the solid vertical  lines 
illustrate  a phenomenon  that appears  to recur in each business cycle, 
with zero or negative  ALP growth  in 1959-60, 1968-69, 1973-74, 1978- 
80, and 1989-90.  MFP  growth  subtracts  from  output  a weighted  average 
of labor  input  and capital  input  growth. Because capital  grew rapidly  in 
the late 1960s,  the slowdown  in MFP  growth  began  earlier  than  the slow- 
down in ALP growth. 
Figure  3 for manufacturing  contrasts sharply  with figure  2; no slow- 
down appears  to have occurred  in the trend  growth  of ALP. The ampli- 
tude of cyclical fluctuations  is greater,  particularly  during  the period  of 
weak growth  in 1955-61,  the 1973  bulge, and  the 1977-80  decline. How- 
ever, the cyclical fluctuations  surrounding  the latest recessions have 
been more moderate  than in the total economy. The straight  trend for 
ALP in manufacturing  contrasts with the evidence for MFP, where a 
slowdown  in growth  seems to have occurred  between 1967  and  the early 
1980s,  followed  by a robust  recovery. The  rapid  growth  of ALP in manu- 
facturing  in the late 1980s  and early 1990s  is qualified  by the base-year 
data  bias, which  affects  manufacturing  to a greater  extent  than  the aggre- 
gate economy. 
Because NFNM constitutes three-quarters  of output in the private 
nonfarm  sector, it is not surprising  that  figure  4 looks much  like figure  2, Robert J. Gordon  287 
Figure 4.  Productivity in Nonfarm Nonmanufacturing Businessa 
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but with a sharper  slowdown  in trend  ALP growth.  Cycles in both ALP 
and  MFP  mimic  those in figure  2. 
Table  4 displays  the annual  average  growth  rates  between  benchmark 
quarters  of output,  hours,  capital  input,  ALP, and  MFP  for all three  sec- 
tors. Also shown in the right-hand  column are growth rates from the 
most recent benchmark  quarter,  1987:3,  to the most recent quarter  with 
available  data, 1992:4.  Among  the important  facts about  the  private  non- 
farm  sector are the two-stage  slowdown  in ALP after 1972  and again  af- 
ter 1978,  and  the three-stage  slowdown  of MFP  (with  almost  zero growth 
during  1978-87).  After 1987,  the growth  rates  of output,  inputs,  and  ALP 
all decelerated,  while MFP  recovered  a bit.27  Presumably,  a good part  of 
the deceleration  in output  and inputs  was caused by the 1990-91  reces- 
sion and slow pace of the 1991-93  recovery, but it remains  to be seen 
how large  the cyclical component  in ALP is. 
In manufacturing,  the most striking  facts are slow output growth 
since 1978, negative labor  input growth since 1978,  the acceleration  in 
ALP growth  after 1987  when compared  to 1972-87, and the faster rate 
of MFP  growth  after 1987  than  that  achieved  over the entire 1963-87  pe- 
riod.  Corresponding  to the relatively  robust  performance  of manufactur- 
ing, particularly  since 1987,  is the pathetic  performance  of the NFNM 
sector. Here ALP growth has been essentially zero since 1978, while 
27.  Capital  input  through  1991  is from the BLS, Productivity  and Costs, various  is- 
sues. Capital  input  for 1992  is based  on a regression  of capital  input  growth  on the share  of 
NIPA  net investment  in GDP  from 1959  to 1991. I-  C,  l-r)  t}-  C'  \D  r-  tn r-  m  0 - 
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MFP  growth  has been negative  since 1978,  and  the same three-stage  de- 
celeration  in MFP  growth  occurred  after 1963, 1972,  and 1978.  All com- 
ments are qualified  by the previous  remarks  on base-year  data  bias. 
Econometric  Specification  and Estimation 
The rest of the paper  is limited  to an analysis  of ALP; the same tech- 
nique can be applied  to MFP. To the extent that MFP is a more funda- 
mental measure of underlying  technical progress, my examination  of 
ALP must be treated as an approximation.  However, two problems 
arise with MFP that give ALP priority. First, several additional  mea- 
surement  errors  enter  into the calculation  of MFP:  errors  in capital  input 
and in capital's  income share  as a proxy for the true  elasticity of output 
to capital.  In addition,  the maintained  assumption  of constant  returns  to 
scale may involve an error. Also,  to develop predictions of future 
growth in potential output needed for forecasts of the federal budget, 
unemployment,  and so on, an estimate of future  MFP growth  must be 
supplemented  with predictions  of growth  in both  labor  and  capital  input. 
In contrast,  in order  to predict  future  growth  in potential  output, a fore- 
cast of future  ALP growth  needs to be joined only by a forecast  of trend 
hours growth, which is less subject  to error  and does not require  fore- 
casts of investment  behavior. 
Dynamic  Specification  and the End-of-Expansion  Effect 
Following the 1974 work of Christopher  Sims and my own  1979 
work,28  I estimate  equations  in which the dependent  variable  is the first 
difference  of the log of hours relative to its trend (Ah -  Ah*). This is 
regressed  on a series of lagged  dependent  variable  terms  and  on the first 
difference  of deviations  of the log of output  from its trend  (Aq -  /q*). 
The output  deviation  variable  in principle  can enter  with leads, the cur- 
rent  value, and  lags. The lags can be interpreted  as reflecting  adjustment 
costs: that  is, delays in hiring  and  firing.  The use of leads  was introduced 
by Sims in the context of his analysis of Granger  causality between 
hours and output.29  A structural  interpretation  of leading output vari- 
28. See Sims  (1974)  and  Gordon  (1979). 
29. Sims  (1974). 290  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
ables is that the choice of labor input is based in part on a forecast of 
future  changes  in output. 
Two additional  variables  are added  to the traditional  regression  that 
relates  first  differences  of hours  deviations  to first  differences  of output 
deviations.  The first  is an error-correction  term. Recently, the concept 
of error  correction  has been linked  to that  of cointegration,  which  can be 
defined  informally  as the notion  that  a linear  combination  of two series- 
for example, the hours deviation  and the output deviation-is  station- 
ary.30  When  two such variables  are cointegrated,  a regression  consisting 
entirely  of differenced  data  will be misspecified,  while a regression  con- 
sisting entirely of level data will omit important  constraints.  The solu- 
tion is to estimate  a regression  of the first  difference  of one variable  on 
the first  difference  of the other,  plus an error  correction  variable  consist- 
ing of the lagged  log ratio  of one variable  to the other.3' 
In my 1979  work, I identified  a tendency  for labor  input  to grow  more 
rapidly  than  can be explained  by output  changes  in the late stages of the 
business  expansion.32  I dubbed  this  tendency  toward  overhiring  the end- 
of-expansion  effect and argued  that it was balanced  by a tendency to 
underhire  in the first  two years or so after the end of the expansion. In 
this paper,  I adopt  a more systematic  approach  to defining  and  interpre- 
ting the EOE effect. According  to the NBER definition,  the expansion 
ends when real output (actually a collection of coincident indicators) 
reaches its absolute peak. This can be distinguished  from the earlier 
peak  of the growth  cycle when output  reaches  its highest  level relative  to 
trend  or potential  output.  The EOE period  is defined  here  as the interval 
between the peak of the growth  cycle and the peak of the NBER cycle; 
by definition,  it is a period  when output  displays  positive but subnormal 
growth.  The overhiring  that consistently  occurs during  the EOE period 
can be interpreted  as resulting from individual  firms incorrectly ex- 
pecting  that  their  output  will keep rising  at or above trend,  while output 
for the aggregate  economy turns  out to grow more slowly than  its trend 
rate. 
The EOE effect is introduced  into the regression  equation  through  a 
set of six dummy  variables.  These are not 0,1 dummies;  rather,  they are 
30. For  the formal  definition  of stationarity  and  co-integration,  see Engle  and  Granger 
(1987,  pp. 252-53). 
31. A complete  taxonomy  of the possible  forms  of dynamic  specification  in a bivariate 
model  is presented  in Hendry,  Pagan,  and  Sargan  (1984,  pp. 1040-49). 
32. Gordon  (1979). Robert  J. Gordon  291 
in the form 1IM, -  1IN,  where M is the length  in quarters  of the period 
of the initial  interval  of excessive labor  input  growth  and  N is the length 
of the subsequent  correction.  By forcing  the sum  of coefficients  on each 
variable  to equal  zero, any overhiring  in the initial  phase  is subsequently 
corrected. The length of the first period, M, is the number  of quarters 
between  the peak  in the growth  cycle and  the peak  of the NBER cycle.33 
The  timing  and  duration,  N, of the subsequent  correction  period  is deter- 
mined by examining  residuals  in equations  that omit the dummies  en- 
tirely.34  The amplitude  of the end-of-expansion  effect is allowed  to differ 
across business cycles by allowing  the dummy  variable  for each episode 
to have its own separate  coefficient. (I subsequently  test whether  these 
coefficients  are significantly  different  from  each other.) 
Combining  these explanatory  variables,  the basic equation  to be esti- 
mated  is 
L  N 
(1)  (Ah  -  Ah*)  =  p +  E  i(h  -  Ah*)t-i  +  E  j(lq  -  Aq*)t-j 
i=k  j=M 
6 
+  4  [(q -  h) -  (q* -  h*)]t-I  +  E  YkDk +  Et, 
where  Dk=  O  in all quarters  except the end-of-expansion  and  subsequent 
correction  period,  which are as follows: 
k  M  Dk=  1/Mduring  N  Dk=  -1/Nduring 
1  8  1955:4-1957:3  3  1957:4-1958:2 
2  5  1959:2-1960:2  9  1960:4-1962:4 
3  7  1968:2-1969:4  6  1970:2-1971:3 
4  6  1973:1-1974:2  7  1974:4-1976:2 
5  6  1978:4-1980:1  8  1981:1-1982:4 
6  7  1989:1-1990:3  8  1991:4-1993:3 
33. The peak of the growth  cycle is defined  by the ratio  of real GDP to natural  real 
GDP;  the latter  measure  is taken  from  Gordon  (1993,  appendix  table A-2). In the 1960s, 
peaks  occurred  in 1966:1  and 1968:2.  I chose the latter.  I chose the termination  date  of the 
fourth  EOE episode to be 1974:2,  rather  than  the NBER peak of 1973:4,  because output 
remained  at a plateau  in the first  half  of 1974,  rather  than  declining  as it normally  does in a 
recession.  (The  level of real  GDP  in 1974:2  was only 0.3 percent  below  the annual  average 
for the year 1973.) 
34. The timing  of the 1991-93  correction  period  is somewhat  arbitrary.  To avoid  inter- 
preting  the 1992  productivity  spurt  entirely  as the result  of the EOE  effect, the correction 
period  is extended  to 1993:3.  But to prevent  too sharp  a jump  in the growth  of predicted 
hours  from 1993  to 1994,  the correction  effect is allowed  to taper  off through  1993.  (The 
correction  part  of the sixth dummy  variable  is defined  as 1/6.5  for 1991:4-1992:4;  0.75/6.5 
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Here p is the constant  term;  the (xi  are the coefficients  on the lagged  de- 
pendent  variable;  the j are the leading,  current,  and  lagged  coefficients 
on the change  in the output  deviation  from  trend;  +  is the coefficient  on 
the error-correction  term;  and the Yk  are the coefficients  on the end-of- 
expansion  dummies.  The Yk  coefficients  indicate  the cumulative  amount 
of excess labor  hired  in a particular  end-of-expansion  episode, measured 
as a percent, and typical  estimates  below are in the range  of 2.5 percent 
cumulative  overhiring  at the end of the expansion  balanced  by a cumula- 
tive - 2.5 percent  adjustment  in hours  during  the subsequent  recession 
and early stages of the recovery.35 
Estimation: Nonfarm  Private Business 
Now that the trends for hours and output have been determined, 
along with the configuration  of the end-of-expansion  dummies,  estima- 
tion of equation 1 is straightforward.  Results for the nonfarm  private 
business sector are displayed  in table 5. Changes  in structure  are tested 
by estimating  over the entire sample  period, 1954:4  to 1992:4,  as well as 
for two subperiods  broken  roughly  in half at 1972:4.  The first  three re- 
gressions  display  results  for three  variants  that  include  the error-correc- 
tion term  and end-of-expansion  dummies  both separately  and together. 
Prior  testing not reported  in the table determined  that  the current  value 
and three lagged  values of the output  deviation  variable  are significant, 
but further  lags are not; leading  values (that Sims and I found  to be sig- 
nificant)36  lose their significance  in the presence of either  the error-cor- 
rection  term  or end-of-expansion  dummies.  Thus in everything  that  fol- 
lows, the line labeled  output  deviations  refers  to the sum of coefficients 
on lags 0-3, and  leading  values are omitted. 
The most important  conclusions from the first three regressions  are 
that  the end-of-expansion  dummies  are  highly  significant,  as is the error- 
correction parameter,  +, by itself; however, in combination  with the 
end-of-expansion  dummies,  the error-correction  parameter  becomes in- 
significant.  The constant  term, R, is always insignificant  and is omitted 
in the last three columns. Hence my preferred specification is that 
shown in the third  regression  of table 5. Noting that the end-of-expan- 
35. The dummy  variable  is defined  as IIM  and -  1IN  when  I use annual  data,  and  41M 
and - 4/N with  quarterly  data. 
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Table 5.  Estimated Equations for Change in Nonfarm Business Hours Relative to 
Trend, 1954:4-1992:4a 
1954.4-  1954:4-  1954:4-  1954:4-  1973:1- 
Independent  variable  1992:4  1992:4  1992.4  1972:4  1992:4 
Constant  0.31  0.13  ...  ...  ... 
(1.82)  (0.82) 
Lagged  dependent  0.18  -0.29  - 0.32  -0.40  -0.25 
(A/h  -  Ah*)  (1.62)  (-2.47)  (-2.75)  (-2.21)  (-1.63) 
Output  deviation  0.67  0.91  0.95  0.95  0.93 
(Aq -  Aq*)  (6.49)  (9.34)  (10.9)  (6.55)  (8.23) 
Error-correction  term  0.26  0.08  ...  ... 
(2.65)  (0.94) 
End-of-expansion 
dummies 
-YI  (1955-58)  . . .  2.25  2.30  2.62  ... 
(3.37)  (3.47)  (3.54) 
_Y2  (l9S9-62)  ...  1.95  1.97  2.01  ... 
(2.65)  (2.69)  (2.63) 
Y  (1968-71)  .  .  .  2.71  2.80  2.98  ... 
(3.89)  (4.08)  (4.04) 
_Y4 (1973-76)  . . .  3.24  3.35  . .  .  3.13 
(4.37)  (4.58)  (3.86) 
Y  (1978-82)  ...  2.65  2.84  ..  .  2.60 
(3.42)  (3.81)  (3.22) 
_Y6  (1988-92)  . . .  3.01  3.15  .  .  .  2.95 
(3.86)  (4.11)  (3.54) 
Summary  Statistic 
R2  0.77  0.83  0.83  0.81  0.83 
SER  1.72  1.50  1.50  1.51  1.54 
SSR  422  309  311  141  164 
Addendum 
All  -y  constrained  to be 
equal  ...  2.57  2.68  2.54  2.89 
-y  coefficient  (6.98)  (7.55)  (5.18)  (5.25) 
SER  ...  1.49  1.48  1.49  1.52 
Source:  Author's  regressions  using  data  described  in table 1. 
L 
a. The regressions  estimate  variations  of equation  I in the text: (Ah -  Ah*),=  .  +  Y  oti  (Ah -  Ah*),-i + 
N  6  i=k 
I  p1  (Aq -  Aq*),_j  +  4 [(q -  h) -  (q* -  h*)],-  I +  Y  -ykDk +  e.  The dependent  variable  is the change  in the 
j=l  h  e  k=1 
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sion coefficients on the six separate  episodes are of roughly  the same 
size, I reran  the equations  to constrain  the six separate  yi  coefficients  to 
be the same  and  determined  that  they are not significantly  different  from 
one another.37  The constrained  value of y is about 2.7, as shown in the 
bottom  section of table 5, implying  cumulative  overhiring  of 2.7 percent 
during the EOE period, followed by a subsequent correction of 2.7 
percent. 
The last two regressions  show that  the coefficients  for the two subpe- 
riods are very close to those for the entire 1954-92  period. A Chow test 
fails to reject the hypothesis of structural  stability;  the F test (8,131)  is 
0.49, compared  to the 5 percent  critical  value of 2.01. Finally, the sums 
of the (x  and 1  coefficients  imply  that  the elasticity  of hours  deviations  to 
output deviations is 1/(1 -  ax)  = 0.72, and hence the response of ALP to 
output  deviations  from  trend  has an elasticity  of 0.28. A dynamic  simula- 
tion of the estimated  equation  indicates  that  initially  hours  adjust  by less 
than  this response, and that  four quarters  are required  for the response 
of hours  deviations  to output  deviations  to arrive  at the value of 0.72. 
Summarizing the Specification:  The Four Frequencies 
of Productivity 
The specification  of hours  adjustment  in equation  1 implies  that  there 
are  four  different  time  frequencies  relevant  for productivity  analysis. At 
the highest frequency, the deviation from trend of labor input adjusts 
with a lag distribution  spreading  over four calendar  quarters  to devia- 
tions  from  trend  of output,  and  as a result,  productivity  movements  lead 
those in output  by a few months.  This high-frequency  movement  occurs 
with the same lead-lag pattern whether the business cycle lasts two 
years or ten. The second frequency  is cyclical and reflects  the fact that 
hours  respond  to a sustained  movement  of output  away from  trend  with 
an elasticity  below unity, about  0.72. Thus  ALP responds  to a sustained 
movement of output away from trend with an elasticity of about 0.28. 
The third  frequency  is also cyclical. This is the end-of-expansion  effect: 
the slump  in productivity  that appears  to occur repeatedly  between the 
peak of the growth  cycle and the peak of the NBER cycle. Finally, the 
fourth  frequency is the trend itself that emerges when the parameters 
37. The  F(5,139)  ratio  for  the difference  in fit  between  the equations  in  the third  column 
of table 5, using six different  EOE coefficients  and a single EOE coefficient,  is 0.24, as 
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Table  6. Estimated  Equations  for Change  in Manufacturing  Hours  Relative  to Trend, 
1954:4-1992:4 
1954:4-  1954:4-  1954:4-  1954:4-  1973:1- 
Independent  variable  1992:4  1992:4  1992.4  1972:4  1992:4 
Constant  0.38  0.20  ...  .... 
(1.63)  (0.86) 
Lagged  dependent  0.37  0.12  0.09  0.03  0.05 
(Ah -  Ah*)  (3.77)  (1.14)  (0.85)  (0.22)  (0.59) 
Output  deviation  0.48  0.62  0.66  0.74  0.66 
(Aq -  Aq*)  (5.47)  (6.84)  (7.89)  (5.87)  (5.77) 
Error-correction term  0.20  0.10  ...  ... 
(2.39)  (1.33) 
End-of-expansion 
dummies 
-YI  (1955-58)  .  .  .  1.98  2.11  2.00  ... 
(1.98)  (2.12)  (2.01) 
_Y2  (195942)  . .  .  1.35  1.44  1.13  ... 
(1.22)  (1.30)  (1.05) 
3  (1968-71)  . ..  2.70  2.79  2.71  ... 
(2.60)  (2.70)  (2.64) 
_Y4 (1973-76)  ...  2.45  2.60  .  .  .  3.33 
(2.21)  (2.36)  (2.72) 
5  (1978-82)  ...  3.74  4.24  . ..  4.46 
(3.13)  (3.72)  (3.65) 
Y6 (1988-92)  . .  .  1.35  1.50  . .  .  1.82 
(1.22)  (1.36)  (1.60) 
Summary  Statistic 
RZ2  0.86  0.88  0.88  0.89  0.87 
SER  2.40  2.29  2.28  2.16  2.31 
SSR  824  716  725  290  368 
Addendum 
All  -y  constrained  to be 
equal  .  .  .  2.16  2.37  1.96  3.10 
-y  coefficient  (4.18)  (4.72)  (3.00)  (3.94) 
SER  .  .  .  2.27  2.28  2.15  2.32 
Source  and notes: See table  5. 
governing  the other  three  frequencies  are  identified;  the loglinear  trends- 
through-benchmarks  technique  allows the trend  to vary from one busi- 
ness cycle to the next. 
Estimation:  The Two Subsectors 
Tables  6 and  7 display  estimated  parameters  in the same  format  as ta- 
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Table  7. Estimated  Equations  for Change  in Nonfarm  Nonmanufacturing  Business 
Hours  Relative  to Trend, 1954:4-1992:4 
1954:4-  1954:4-  1954:4-  1954.4-  1973:1- 
Independent  variable  1992:4  1992:4  1992:4  1972:4  1992:4 
Constant  0.23  0.13  ...  ...  ... 
(1.27)  (0.75) 
Lagged  dependent  0.08  -0.36  -0.40  -0.60  - 0.30 
(Ah -  Ah*)  (0.70)  (-2.51)  (-2.86)  (-2.60)  (-1.66) 
Output  deviation  0.59  0.71  0.77  0.65  0.81 
(Aq -  Aq*)  (5.68)  (6.98)  (8.49)  (3.99)  (7.10) 
Error-correction term  0.27  0.15  ...  ...  ... 
(2.67)  (1.51) 
End-of-expansion 
dummies 
-YI  (1955-58)  ..  .  1.98  2.06  2.86 
(2.37)  (2.46)  (2.84) 
Y2 (1959-62)  . ..  2.19  2.21  2.52 
(2.37)  (2.39)  (2.50) 
3  (1968-71)  .  .  .  2.13  2.37  2.72  ... 
(2.46)  (2.79)  (2.91) 
4  (1973-76)  . ..  2.75  2.97  ...  2.65 
(2.96)  (3.24)  (2.82) 
Y5 (1978-82)  . ..  2.05  2.28  . . .  1.86 
(2.13)  (2.39)  (1.92) 
Y6 (1988-92)  . ..  3.79  4.03  .  .  .  3.56 
(3.69)  (3.96)  (3.36) 
Summary  Statistic 
K2  0.47  0.54  0.54  0.40  0.63 
SER  2.03  1.89  1.89  1.98  1.84 
SSR  592  490  498  242  234 
Addendum 
All  -y  constrained  to be 
equal  ...  2.34  2.52  2.69  2.60 
,y  coefficient  (5.09)  (5.60)  (4.20)  (3.85) 
SER  ...  1.88  1.88  1.95  1.84 
Source and notes:  See  table 5. 
because  NFNM makes  up three-quarters  of the nonfarm  business  aggre- 
gate,  the results  in table  7 are  quite  similar  to those in table  5. The  elastic- 
ity of hours to output, I, is lower, possibly reflecting  measurement  er- 
ror,  the goodness  of fit  is worse, and  the end-of-expansion  dummies  tend 
to have lower t-ratios  than  in table  5.38 
38. The EOE dummies  are identical  in the two subsectors as in the aggregate;  no 
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Table  6 reflects  the higher  volatility  of manufacturing  hours  and out- 
put;  both the R2  and the standard  error  of estimate  are higher  than  in ta- 
ble 5. In all  columns  of table  6, the response  of hours  deviations  to output 
deviations is smaller  over the first four quarters  than for the nonfarm 
business  sector  in table  5; this implies  that, on average,  productivity  dis- 
plays a larger  response to cyclical output  deviations  in the manufactur- 
ing sector than  in the total economy. 
An interesting  result is that in the 1988-92  cycle, the end-of-expan- 
sion effect in manufacturing  is unusually  low and  in NFNM is unusually 
high. In contrast,  the end-of-expansion  effect in manufacturing  was un- 
usually  high  for 1978-82,  the "Rust  Belt"  episode. These estimated  coef- 
ficients support  the thrust  of popular  commentary.  The early 1980s  wit- 
nessed an unusually  savage downsizing  of manufacturing  employment, 
whereas the early 1990s  have witnessed a corporate  downsizing  move- 
ment  in the NFNM sector. The difference  between the  journalistic  ver- 
sion of these episodes and my econometric  version, however, is that in 
each case there was end-of-expansion  overhiring  that preceded the 
downsizing. Journalists,  by contrast, focus on the firings  and layoffs, 
while omitting  mention  of the overhiring  that  came earlier. 
The Underlying Trend in Labor's Average Product, 1987-92 
The specification  of the econometric  equation  estimated  in the previ- 
ous section requires  that the first difference  of hours and of output be 
expressed as deviations  from trend. For the period through  1987, log- 
linear  trends  are extended  between the benchmark  quarters  listed in ta- 
ble 3. However, there  is no benchmark  quarter  after  1987,  because  at the 
end of the sample  period  in late 1992,  the unemployment  rate remained 
well above its natural  rate of about 6 percent.39  All the estimates dis- 
cussed in the previous section assume arbitrarily  that the productivity 
trend  recorded  in 1972-87  continues  during  1987-92.4?  In this section, I 
39. Recall  that  the criteria  for a benchmark  quarter  are that  the unemployment  rate  is 
close to the natural  rate, currently  about  6 percent;  that  the unemployment  rate  is falling 
(thus ruling  out the period  in late 1990  when the unemployment  rate was 6 percent  but 
unemployment  was rising);  and  that  the end-of-expansion  effect  is nonoperative. 
40. More  precisely,  a trend  for hours  is established  for each of the three  sectors, and 
then  the output  trend  is equal  to the hours  trend  plus  the assumed  productivity  trend.  To 
fix  the hours  trend  in all the regressions  estimated  in tables  4-7, I assumed  that  a 6 percent 298  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
search for the optimal 1987-92  productivity  trend that yields the best- 
fitting  equations  estimated  for the period 1973-92. 
Cumulative 1987-92 Errors in Alternative Equations 
To illustrate  the sensitivity  of the results  to the form  of the specifica- 
tion, figure 5 displays cumulative  forecasting errors over the 1987:4- 
1992:4  period  for the nonfarm  business sector. There  are  three  frames  in 
the diagram,  corresponding  to three different  versions of the equation, 
each estimated  over the 1973-92  interval.  In each frame,  cumulative  er- 
rors are shown for three different  assumptions  about the 1987-92  pro- 
ductivity  trend. 
The top frame  uses the version  of the equation  that  excludes the end- 
of-expansion  terms  but  includes  the error-correction  term.  (This  version 
corresponds  to the first  regression  of table 5, reestimated  for the shorter 
1973-92  period.)  No matter  whether  the assumed 1987-92  productivity 
trend  is 0.75, 1.00, or 1.25  percent  per year, this version  of the equation 
makes large  positive forecasting  errors,  implying  that the growth  of ac- 
tual labor  input  during  1987-91  is substantially  larger  than  the equation 
predicts.  Furthermore,  the cumulative  error  is eliminated  by slow hours 
growth  of 1992  only when the 1987-92  productivity  trend  is set at a rela- 
tively low 0.75 percent  per year. 
The middle  frame  uses the version of the equation  that excludes the 
error-correction  term and includes the end-of-expansion  dummy  vari- 
ables. (This  frame  corresponds  to the last regression  estimated  in table 
5.) The cumulative  errors  plotted  in the middle  frame  are much smaller 
than  those in the top frame  because much  of the excess growth  of hours 
in the 1989-90 period is explained by the end-of-expansion  dummy 
(which has its "on"  phase during  1989:1-1990:3).  The cumulative  error 
at the end of the period  in 1992:4  is closest to zero with a relatively  slow 
assumed  productivity  trend  of 1.00  percent  per year. 
unemployment  rate  (in  contrast  to the 7.3 percent  unemployment  rate  recorded  in 1992:4) 
would  require  a level of hours 1.6  percent  higher  than  actually  occurred  in 1992:4.  Of this 
1.6 percent  difference,  1.2 percent  is required  to reduce  the unemployment  rate to 6 per- 
cent, and the remaining  0.4 percent  is assumed  to be reflected  in some combination  of 
higher  hours  per  employee  and  a higher  labor  force participation  rate.  The  implied  annual 
trend  growth  rate of hours during  1987:3-1992:4  is 0.87 percent  for nonfarm  business, 
- 0.56 for manufacturing,  and 1.32  percent  for NFNM. Robert J. Gordon  299 
Figure  5. Cumulative  Forecasting  Errors  for Nonfarm  Business  Hours, 1987:4-1992:4a 
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Source:  Author's  calculations. 
a. Each panel depicts the forecasting  errors  using three different  assumptions  about the 1987-92  productivity 
trend.  The panels  differ  in terms  of equation  specification  as follows. The first  panel uses the specification  of the 
first  regression  estimated  in table 5 with an error-correction  term and no EOE dummies,  but estimates  it for the 
shorter  period  of 1973:1-1992:4.  The second panel  uses the specification  of the last regression  estimated  in table  5, 
which  includes  EOE dummies  but excludes an error-correction  term. The third  panel's specification  is similar  to 
second  panel's,  except that  the EOE term  has its "on"  phase  one year  earlier,  from 1988:1-1989:3. 300  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
However, in the middle  frame  the cumulative  errors  display  a consis- 
tent  hump-shaped  pattern  that  is independent  of the assumed  trend.  This 
occurs because the equation  cannot explain why hours growth  was so 
rapid  (or  productivity  growth  was so slow) during  1988,  before  the onset 
of the EOE interval.  To determine  how this early  initiation  of overhiring 
interacts  with the underlying  trend,  I define  an alternative  EOE variable 
which has its "on"  phase one year earlier  (1988:1-1989:3)  than  the stan- 
dard  variable,  but retains the same definition  of the correction  ("off') 
phase. The cumulative  errors  with this alternative  early EOE variable 
are plotted in the bottom  frame  of figure  5 and are much  closer to zero. 
There is little impact  on the trend;  the trend  that brings  the cumulative 
error  closest to zero in 1992:4  is 1.00  percent  per year,  just as in the mid- 
dle frame  with the standard  EOE definition. 
Searching for  the Optimal Trend 
Figure 5 displays various assumed trends. The analysis can be ex- 
tended  by conducting  a grid  search  for the best-fitting  trend  for each sec- 
tor and  for each version of the specification.  Table  8 displays  the actual 
1972-87  growth  rates  of productivity  with  and  without  correction  for the 
base-year  data bias, the optimal 1987-92  trends  resulting  from the grid 
search, and the residual  for each equation  during  the final  four quarters 
of the sample period ending in 1992:4.  A negative residual  means that 
hours  growth  is overpredicted  in 1992:  that is, productivity  grew faster 
than  the equation  can explain. 
The first  section of the table  displays  results  for the nonfarm  business 
sector-the  same sector displayed  in figure  5; the results  are consistent 
with  that  graph.  The optimal  1987-92  trend  is only 0.73 percent  when  the 
EOE effect is excluded, but a more robust 1.10  percent  when the EOE 
effect is included.  The 1992  residual  with the EOE effect is only - 0.27 
percent. 
The second and  third  sections of table  8 display  optimal  trends  for the 
manufacturing  and  NFNM sectors. For each sector, the inclusion  of the 
EOE effect raises the optimal  1987-92  trend.  The inclusion  of the EOE 
effect reduces  the residuals  for 1992,  making  them  negative  in both sec- 
tors. The EOE effect makes little difference  to the absolute size of the 
manufacturing  residual  for 1992  but substantially  reduces the absolute 
size of the 1992  residual  in the NFNM sector. The fourth  section of the Robert  J. Gordon  301 
Table  8. Best-Fitting  Productivity  Growth  Trends 
Percent  per year 
Actual Growth  Rate 
1972:2-1987:3  Optimal  Mean 
1972*2187.  trend,  residual, 
Benchmark  1987:3-  1992:1- 
Sector  Equation  type  Official  reweighted  1992:4  1992:4 
Nonfarm  No EOE effect  0.98  1.28  0.73  -1.16 
business  With  EOE effect  0.98  1.28  1.10  -0.27 
Manufacturing  No EOE effect  2.13  3.13  2.51  0.46 
With  EOE effect  2.13  3.13  2.65  -0.45 
Nonfarm  No EOE effect  0.48  0.46  0.03  1.04 
nonmanufacturing  With  EOE effect  0.48  0.46  0.66  -0.32 
business 
Nonfarm  No EOE effect  0.98  1.28  0.78  0.86 
business  aggre-  With  EOE effect  0.98  1.28  1.26  -0.36 
gated  from sub- 
sectors 
Source:,  Author's  calculations  based  on Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  Productivity  and Costs. 
a. All equations  are  estimated  from  1973:1-1992:4.  The best-fitting  trends  are those  that  minimize  the root  squared 
error  of the particular  equation  over 1987:4-1992:4. 
table displays the weighted average  of the two subsectors;  the implied 
optimal  productivity  trend  for the nonfarm  business sector is 1.26 per- 
cent per year, more rapid  than  the direct  estimate  of 1.10  percent  in the 
first section. In view of the numerous  sources of measurement  error  in 
the subsector  data, the direct  estimates in the first  section are probably 
more  reliable  than  the estimates  in the fourth  section  based  on subsector 
data. 
Interpreting Cyclical Fluctuations  in Productivity 
The distinguishing  feature of productivity  change in the aggregate 
economy over the past five years is a long period  of zero growth  during 
1987-91,  followed by a sharp  upsurge  in 1992.  Can this record  be inter- 
preted  as normal  cyclical behavior?  The performance  of the basic equa- 
tion (with the standard  EOE effect and optimal 1987-92 trend of 1.10 
percent)  is plotted in figure  6. The actual and predicted  values of labor 
productivity  and the deviation of productivity  from its assumed trend 
are displayed. 
The equation  does an acceptable  job of tracking  cyclical fluctuations 
in productivity,  and in fact performs  better in 1987-92  than in previous 302  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Figure  6. Actual  and Predicted  Productivity  for Nonfarm  Business,  1973-92a 
Index,  1972:2  = 100 
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a.  The  1987-92  assumed  productivity  trend  is  1.1,  and  the  equation  estimated  includes  standard-timing  EOE 
effects. 
cyclical episodes. The appearance  of serial correlation  in the plot re- 
flects the fact that  the equation  is estimated  in first  differences  (where  no 
serial correlation  exists), but plotted in levels. The errors  in figure  6- 
the actual values minus the predicted  values-are  computed  by cumu- 
lating  the first-difference  equation  residuals  beginning  in the first  quarter 
of the sample period (1973:  1). These errors  are thus equivalent  to the 
cumulative  errors  plotted in figure  5. The equations  tend to predict  too 
large  a decline in productivity  and subsequent  recovery in the 1973-77 
period  and too small  a decline in productivity  in the 1982  recession. As 
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Table  9. Alternative  Growth  Rate Forecasts  for Nonfarm  Business,  Four  Quarters 
Ending  1993:4  and 1994:4a 
Percent  per year 
Hours  Output  per hour 
Forecast specification  1993:4  1994:4  1993:4  1994:4 
No  EOE effect and pro-  2.48  2.53  0.72  0.67 
ductivity  trend  of 0.73 
Standard  EOE effect and  1.68  1.89  1.52  1.32 
productivity trend  of 
1.10 
Early  EOE effect and  pro-  1.53  1.84  1.67  1.36 
ductivity  trend  of 1.10 
Source:  Authors calculations. 
a.  The assumed  output growth rate is 3.2 percent per year. 
effect also misses the overhiring  that  occurred  in 1988,  and  hence its pre- 
diction of the late 1980s  decline in productivity  occurs about  a year too 
late. However, the prediction  of the 1991-92  recovery  of productivity  is 
right on track. The predicted deviation of productivity  from trend in 
1992:4  is - 2.5 percent, implying  that there is substantial  room  for pro- 
ductivity growth to proceed at a rate above the assumed 1.1 percent 
trend  during  1993-95  without  implying  a need to reassess the trend.4' 
Forecasts  for  1993-94 
For any assumed  growth  rate of output  in 1993-94,  each of the equa- 
tions can be used to divide output between a predicted  path of hours 
growth  and  a residual  path  of productivity  growth.  For output  growth,  I 
assume  a steady  annual  growth  rate  during  the eight  quarters  of 1993-94 
of 3.2 percent  per year, the current  consensus of the blue chip group  of 
economic forecasters. The productivity  trend is the optimal  rate listed 
in the first  section of table 8. 
As shown in table 9, all equations forecast substantial  growth in 
hours, in contrast  to the zero growth  that characterized  1992.  The two 
alternative  equations-based  on standard  and early EOE effects-pre- 
dict  productivity  growth  in the range  of 1.5-1.7 percent  for 1993  and 1.3- 
1.4 percent  for 1994.  These relatively  slow rates of productivity  growth 
41. Productivity  growth  during  the three years 1993-95  at a rate of 1.93 percent  per 
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would leave the deviation  from trend  (as plotted in the bottom  of figure 
6) still from -  1.7 to -  1.9 percent  in 1994:4.  The failure  of productivity 
to recover to its trend is the counterpart  of the assumed 3.2 percent 
growth  rate  of output,  a much  slower  rate  than  at the same stage  of previ- 
ous business-cycle  expansions. 
Conclusion 
The performance  of average  labor  productivity  and multifactor  pro- 
ductivity  in the U. S. economy was dismal  from 1972  to 1991.  Does the 
relatively  rapid  growth in ALP and MFP experienced  in 1991-92 war- 
rant  optimism  that relief has arrived  from the two-decade-long  produc- 
tivity  growth  slowdown?  The answer  depends  on whether  the recent  ex- 
perience  represents  an acceleration  in the underlying  long-term  trend  or 
just a normal  cyclical upturn  that  is similar  to behavior  in previous  busi- 
ness cycles. To provide the answer, this paper  proposes a method for 
separating  trend  from  cycle. 
I show that  cyclical productivity  does not simply  parallel  the cycle in 
output  that determines  the dates of NBER peaks and troughs.  Instead, 
productivity displays complex cyclical behavior that can be decom- 
posed into three different  time frequencies. First is the high-frequency 
movement  caused  by the relatively  short  lag of hours  behind  output;  this 
adjustment  in hours  is completed  within  four quarters  after  a change in 
output  relative  to trend.  Second, the adjustment  of hours  within  the first 
four  quarters  has a cumulative  elasticity  to output  of 0.72, leaving  a posi- 
tive elasticity of ALP to deviations  in output  from trend  that lasts until 
these deviations disappear-that  is, for the duration  of the business 
cycle. Third,  productivity  systematically  displays an end-of-expansion 
slump  between  the peak  in the growth  cycle (the  peak  for detrended  out- 
put)  and  the NBER peak  (defined  for the absolute  level of output);  a cor- 
rection  in the two years or so after  the NBER peak follows; during  this 
correction  period,  productivity  growth  is more  rapid  than  would  be pre- 
dicted on the basis of output  growth  alone. I interpret  this phenomenon 
as the result of overoptimism  by business firms that is subsequently 
corrected. 
This paper  provides strong support  for the end-of-expansion  effect. 
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clical  behavior  through  the mid-1970s,  has now recurred  in two more  cy- 
clical episodes, 1978-82  and 1989-93.  Equations  that  include  the end-of- 
expansion  effect provide  a much improved  fit of the data and are quite 
robust,  passing  a test for structural  stability  over the full 1954-92  period. 
The 1988-91  decline  in productivity  relative  to trend  and  the subsequent 
1991-92  recovery are tracked  quite accurately. As a byproduct,  inclu- 
sion of the end-of-expansion  effect provides  a more  optimistic  interpre- 
tation of the trend  in productivity  growth  over the past five years than 
an equation  that  omits this effect. 
For two alternative  definitions  of the end-of-expansion  effect, the 
best-fitting  1987-92  productivity  trend  for the private  nonfarm  economy 
is 1.1  percent  per  year. When  the best-fitting  trends  are  determined  sepa- 
rately  for the manufacturing  and  nonfarm  nonmanufacturing  sectors and 
then aggregated,  the result  is 1.26  percent  per year. Both of these rates 
are below the actual 1972-87  growth rate of 1.28 percent per year ob- 
tained  by correcting  the bias in the official  data  that arises  from  its fixed 
1987  weighting  scheme. The best-fitting  1987-92 trends at the sectoral 
level imply  that  there  has been a substantial  0.5 percent  per  year  deceler- 
ation in the growth  rate of manufacturing  productivity  as compared  to 
the 1972-87  growth  rate  corrected  for the base-year  data  bias, offset by 
a modest 0.2 percent acceleration  for the nonfarm  nonmanufacturing 
sector. 
How does the econometric  investigation  assess the widespread  jour- 
nalistic view that a new era of productivity-led  growth  is at hand?  The 
only way to emerge  with an optimistic  conclusion  is to focus entirely  on 
1991-92  and ignore  the productivity  stagnation  of 1987-91. Those who 
would argue  that there was a one-shot  jump of productivity  in 1992,  as 
opposed  to a normal  cyclical correction  of the type that  has occurred  re- 
peatedly  in past cycles, are forced to conclude that  the trend  from 1972 
to 1991  is even more  dismal  than  previously  believed. 
However, the detailed  analysis does provide  a few glimmers  of sup- 
port for some aspects of the popular  view. First, the end-of-expansion 
effect estimated  for the 1989-92  episode is among  the largest  on record, 
with  an estimate  of 3.2 percent  cumulative  overhiring  (followed  by a cu- 
mulative  3.2 percent  decline  during  1991-93  in labor  input  relative  to the 
level implied  by output  growth).  Second, the end-of-expansion  effect in 
the recent episode has been much smaller  than usual in manufacturing 
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the  journalistic  view that  the current  wave of corporate  downsizing  and 
restructuring  is unusual,  both in its size and in its concentration  in the 
service sector and  in white-collar  occupations. 
What  the popular  view misses quite  consistently,  however, is that  the 
wave of downsizing  does not emerge  out of thin  air  but  is the direct  result 
of extensive overhiring  in the NFNM sector during  the late 1980s.  If the 
economic difficulties  of the early 1990s  come to be labeled  generally  as 
an economic hangover, then the jobless recovery of 1991-92 can be 
viewed as a hangover  reaction  to a binge  of overhiring  in the late 1980s- 
just as sluggish  spending  by consumers  and business firms  has come to 
be viewed widely as a hangover reaction to excess indebtedness in- 
curred  in the mid- to late 1980s. Perhaps  the business press could be 
urged  to replace  the common  expression  "corporate  restructuring"  with 
the more  appropriate  phrase, "correcting  our  past mistakes." Comments 
and Discussion 
Martin Neil Baily: I will comment  first  on the specific  empirical  results 
given in this paper, and then will talk more  generally  about  the produc- 
tivity  trend  and  the nature  of the short-term  cyclical  productivity  puzzle. 
Based on his earlier  work, Robert  Gordon  argues  that  a surge  in produc- 
tivity is a normal  cyclical pattern, the counterpart  to a period of very 
weak  productivity  growth  or of productivity  decline  that  precedes  reces- 
sions. He has identified  this pattern  and labeled it an end-of-expansion 
effect and a subsequent  bounceback. 
I have found this story to be a pretty good one. Both George Perry 
and Charlie  Schultze  have told me that  they burned  their  fingers  back in 
the 1970s  arguing  that the very rapid  productivity  growth  that accom- 
panied  the recovery  from  the 1974-75  recession was a sign  that no long- 
term  decline  in the productivity  growth  trend  had  occurred,  when  in fact 
the improvement  turned out to be ephemeral. In Charlie Schultze's 
case, this contributed  to an overestimate  of the amount  of slack in the 
economy and an underestimate  of the dangers of inflation  in the late 
1970s. I burned  my own fingers  in 1984  arguing  the same thing; once 
again,  the productivity  trend,  at least for the business sector as a whole, 
showed little improvement.  The growth of productivity  in recoveries 
makes  it easy to believe mistakenly  that  the growth  trend  has improved. 
As Yogi Berra  put it, the current  wave of productivity  optimism  may be 
deja vu all over again. 
In this paper, Gordon starts by running  the smoothing  package of 
Robert Hodrick and Edward Prescott. The results from this analysis 
support  the view that  no significant  change  in the trend  has occurred.  No 
307 308  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
value of the smoothing  parameter  gives a predicted  trend  in the past few 
years that is significantly  higher  than  the trend  from 1972  to 1987. 
Second, Gordon uses his preferred  estimation technique of fitting 
piecewise linear trends to "break points," defined as quarters with 
roughly  similar  unemployment  rates  and  during  which  unemployment  is 
falling.  He adds his dummy  variables  for the end-of-expansion  collapse 
and the subsequent bounceback. His basic results indicate that the 
bounceback  variable  easily accounts for the recent growth spurt. Gor- 
don finds  that there has been a 12 to 28 basis point improvement  in the 
trend since 1987.  But as he points out, this much of an improvement  is 
not an indication  of a real increase in the pace of productivity  growth, 
because the use of base-year  prices biases growth  up in years after the 
base year, and  down in years prior  to the base year. The bias is about  30 
basis points  prior  to 1987. 
What  might  be wrong with Gordon's  approach?  He made  judgment 
calls that could have been made in other ways with different  results. 
First, Gordon  chooses his break  points in a way that  may  help his result 
along. They occur well before the economy has reached  a peak and do 
not always precede the peak by the same period. For example, very 
rapid  productivity  growth  occurred  in 1972  and 1973;  many  other  econo- 
mists have placed  this event in the  pre-slowdown  period.  This makes  the 
slowdown look worse and the chances of recovery look better. Gor- 
don's break  point, in contrast,  occurs in early 1972;  this puts the 1972- 
73 growth  into the post-slowdown  period and makes it harder  to find a 
recovery. 
Second, in his previous  work of this kind  and in an earlier  version of 
this paper, Gordon  chose the timing  of the end-of-expansion  dummies 
after  peeking  at the data.  This procedure  carries  the danger  that  the tim- 
ing was chosen to get rid  of some pesky residuals,  leading  to an upward 
bias in the estimated  size of the effects he is capturing.  In this version  of 
his paper, he has adopted a suggestion  by James Tobin and dated the 
dummies  by the onset of the "growth  recessions"  that  occur prior  to the 
full-fledged  NBER recessions. This is a much  better  procedure  and  I ap- 
plaud  Gordon  for adopting  it, but it does not eliminate  the problem  com- 
pletely. The fact that Gordon  ends up with lower coefficients  and t-sta- 
tistics after making  the change in specification  reinforces  the concern 
about  adding  a series of dummies,  rather  than  linking  these movements 
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Third,  the specification  assumes  that  the end-of-expansion  collapse  is 
worked  off in the recovery, regardless  of the strength  of that recovery. 
In his basic specification,  the end-of-expansion  decline in productivity 
is reversed, even though  employment  has not recovered  overall. 
This last point gets me to a key issue, which is also mentioned  in the 
Perry-Schultze  paper  in this volume. Relative to prior  recoveries, pro- 
ductivity growth in this recovery is not that unusual-consistent  with 
there  being  no change  in the productivity  trend.  On  the other  hand,  rela- 
tive to past  recoveries,  the growth  of both  output  and  employment  in this 
recovery  is very weak and  hence very atypical.  So achieving  strong  pro- 
ductivity  growth  despite very slow output  growth  could indicate  an im- 
provement  in the trend  of productivity.  The reason Gordon  reaches his 
conclusion is that his basic specification  is based implicitly  on the first 
interpretation  of the historical  data. Gordon's  timing  of the EOE effect 
(by delaying  the rebound  period  to 1991:4-1993:3)  essentially  recognizes 
that  perhaps  the bounceback  in this recovery may not be the same as in 
prior  recoveries because it is so weak. But in the end, he is reinforcing 
the sense of the arbitrariness  of the exact specification  and  how sensitive 
the results  are to small  changes. 
I do not believe that the issues can be decided based upon the data 
that have been put on the table. It is very early in the recovery;  we sim- 
ply do not have enough  experience  with slow recoveries  to be able  to tell 
whether  strong  productivity  growth  will continue as the recovery con- 
tinues  or whether  output  and  employment  will rise much  more  closely in 
step, and  hence indicate  continued  long-term  weakness in productivity. 
I turn  now to a broader  perspective. Many  of us have been studying 
the productivity  trend  for a number  of years. Surely we should be able 
to say what  has caused  the slowdown  and  hence whether  the reasons  for 
weak growth have been overcome. Unfortunately,  there is a lot more 
uncertainty  about  the causes of the slowdown  than  I would  like. I wish I 
had something  definitive  to offer in this regard,  but I do not. Still, I can 
suggest  some helpful  measures  to examine. 
I will list four sources of the slowdown  that I would  expect to be less 
of a problem  in the 1990s.  These provide  reasons  to expect faster  growth 
in the future. My first source is the idea that slow growth may simply 
have been a matter  of chance. Suppose Robert  Solow was right  in 1956 
and  technical  change  really is exogenous; that is to say, it is not related 
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ductivity  grew at a constant rate, but he has made it clear that this was 
an assumption  of modeling  convenience. Suppose instead  that the pro- 
ductivity  trend  is a stochastic process. Every few years a productivity 
trend growth rate is picked, as though one were picking  from a set of 
straws  of different  lengths.  There  must  be some serial  correlation  to that 
stochastic process. This means that because short straws have been 
picked  for twenty years, the expected length  of the current  straw-that 
is to say, the expected trend  rate of productivity  growth  over the next 
five or ten years-is  likely to be short, too. On the other hand, some 
weight surely should  be given to the sixty to eighty years prior  to 1973. 
This was a period  of pretty  good growth  overall. It seems reasonable  to 
expect that growth  in the 1990s  will be better  than it was during  the un- 
usually weak years of the 1970s  and 1980s. The economy will benefit 
from  regression  to the mean. 
As a footnote, I realize  that this argument  could be taken in other di- 
rections. If the relevant  time  horizon  is 500 years, not 80 or 100,  then  the 
expected growth  rate  for the 1990s  would  be pretty  low. Robert  Gordon 
and William  Nordhaus  have essentially made such an argument,  sug- 
gesting  that  the period  of rapid  innovation  and  growth  in the middle  part 
of the century  was anomalous  in U.S. economic history. I disagree  with 
this view and prefer  to look at the period  of industrialization  to provide 
the sample  from which parameters  are inferred.  But that is a matter  of 
taste. 
My second source of the slowdown  is that the economy experienced 
some heavy disruptions  in the 1970s  and 1980s.  First, oil prices gyrated, 
and both ups and downs were costly. Second, entire industries  disap- 
peared  or were restructured  in response to international  specialization, 
changing  demand, and deregulation.  Third, safety and environmental 
regulation  escalated sharply. Fourth, large demographic  changes oc- 
curred  in the labor  market. 
Disruptions  like these are hard  on the economy and make it difficult 
for managers  to concentrate  on raising  productivity.  If further  economic 
disruptions  can be avoided, stronger  growth can be expected in the 
1990s. 
My third  source  of the slowdown  is the idea that  the electronics  revo- 
lution  soaked  up resources  that  could have been used in other  ways and 
did not provide  a growth  payoff of its own. Gordon  quotes Steve Roach 
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of overinvestment  in computers;  he is now arguing  that companies  are 
beginning  to achieve major gains in productivity  because they have 
learned  how to use their  information  technology  effectively. Paul  David 
and  other  economic  historians  have reminded  us that  it takes a long time 
to absorb  a new technology,  ' so it should  come as no surprise  that it has 
taken a while to use computers  to raise productivity.  Of course, it may 
be another ten years before the payoff occurs, but Steve Roach now 
hears a different  story from  companies, and so do I. This recession has 
clearly differed from prior recessions in that services have been hit 
harder  than usual, consistent with the idea that restructuring  is under- 
way that will raise productivity.  One reason to expect faster growth  in 
the 1990s is that the economy can expect to reap the rewards of the 
heavy investment  that  has been made  in information  technology. 
My fourth possible source of slow previous growth is that major 
changes in industrial  organization  have occurred  in the U.S. economy. 
Deregulation  has been substantial,  foreign competition  has increased, 
and unions are a much less powerful  force in the labor market.  These 
shifts could have hurt productivity  in the short run. Deregulation  can 
throw  industries  into turmoil;  the airlines  are an obvious example. And 
unions  have been found  in some econometric  work  to be associated  with 
high  levels of productivity,  so that  eliminating  unions  may  have hurt  pro- 
ductivity. But competition  helps productivity  growth, once the adjust- 
ment period is over. And nonunion  companies seem to achieve higher 
productivity  growth.  The increasing  competition  in the 1970s  and 1980s 
may have served  as an investment  in growth  for the 1990s. 
One more source  of the productivity  slowdown  is probably  neutral  in 
its impact  on future  growth.  This is measurement  error.  The quality  of 
measurement  in services is weaker  than that in manufacturing  or other 
goods production;  thus  as the locus of employment  and  innovation  shifts 
toward services, this could lead to an increasing understatement  of 
growth. I consider this factor neutral  for the future because I do not 
know  whether  the ability  of the statistics  to capture  productivity  growth 
will improve  or decline. 
What  about factors impeding  growth?  Are there any sources of the 
1970s and 1980s slowdown that may continue or even worsen in the 
1990s?  My first negative is capital. Many people stress that capital in- 
1.  David (1990). 312  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
vestment is a key element in growth-particularly equipment  invest- 
ment-and  that slow capital  growth  was a source of slow productivity 
growth.  Some of the evidence is a bit iffy, but regardless,  the immediate 
prospects for growth generated  by capital investment of all kinds are 
only fair. The budget  deficit can crowd out either  domestic investment 
or net foreign  investment. Net foreign investment  was crowded out in 
the 1980s;  domestic  investment  may  suffer  in the 1990s  unless  the budget 
deficit  is really  controlled. 
My second negative is a nonpositive, rather  than a true negative. In 
an earlier discussion of Gordon's paper, I argued that demographic 
trends  were more  favorable  to growth  in the 1990s.  But Gordon  pointed 
out that  most of this demographic  improvement  had  already  taken  place 
by the 1980s, so demographic  trends do not seem to be a promising 
source  of additional  growth  for the 1990s. 
My conclusion from looking at the reasons for the slowdown is that 
the positives look stronger  than the negatives. There are reasonable 
grounds  for hope that  growth  will be faster  in the 1990s.  But  that  is a very 
subjective  choice. 
I look now at the nature  of the cyclical behavior  of productivity.  I will 
distinguish  two alternative  explanations of it. The first is that labor 
hoarding  occurs. Firms  hold excess labor  for a while because they think 
that  output  will recover. They may do this to preserve  firm-specific  hu- 
man  capital  or to reduce  income  variance  among  their  workers.  An alter- 
native view is that there are increasing  returns  to scale. For example, a 
steel mill  designed  for a certain  capacity  will run  inefficiently  with slack 
capacity. Or an office may be set up with certain  tasks allocated  to cer- 
tain  people  and  have only a limited  amount  of flexibility  to let one person 
cover two  jobs, even if both have become effectively part-time  jobs. 
There  is a fine  line between  these two views. For example,  increasing 
returns  may not really be increasing  returns  if there is enough time to 
adjust  the quasi-fixed  factors  of production,  including  the organizational 
capital  involved in allocating  tasks. And on the other side, very large 
amounts  of firm-specific  human  capital  (or the availability  of alternative 
tasks, such as training  or maintenance,  for workers  to do) could make 
labor  into a fixed  factor  over the relevant  period  of observation.  In other 
words,  a model  of labor  hoarding  could  be built  that  was observationally 
similar  to a model of increasing  returns. Robert J. Gordon  313 
Despite this blurring  of distinction,  labor  hoarding  is generally  short 
term and temporary  and increasing  returns  are generally  longer term. 
The two approaches  imply  a timing  difference. 
The implications  of this for the Gordon  analysis of trend and cycle 
are that it affects one's view of the speed or nature  of the productivity 
bounceback.  If the cyclical pattern  of labor  productivity  reflects  primar- 
ily short-term  labor  hoarding,  then  the bounceback  of productivity  in the 
recovery could be expected to respond  to the passage of time. In other 
words, the basic Gordon specification  fits best to a short-term  labor 
hoarding  view. If the cyclical pattern  of productivity  is a reflection  of 
more long-term  increasing  returns,  then the strength  of the recovery is 
crucial. With very slow output and input  growth, the economy would 
not get the productivity  effect of restoring  efficient  full capacity  produc- 
tion in industries  subject  to fundamental  increasing  returns. 
Is there  any evidence to choose between  these views? There  is plenty 
of anecdotal  evidence to support  the labor  hoarding  view; James  Medoff 
reported  on a survey a few years back that added  to this anecdotal  evi- 
dence. Of course, increasing  returns  has been a big player  in the recent 
literature,  with support  being  offered  by Robert  Hall and  others. 
The  preliminary  work  that  I have done  with  Eric  Bartelsman  and  John 
Haltiwanger  on plant  level data seems to support  the increasing  returns 
view. We expected to find  that  plants  that  were downsizing  employment 
over a ten-year  time horizon  would reduce  productivity  less during  re- 
cessions. Why  hoard  labor  if you are not going  to need it even when the 
recovery starts?  This did not appear  to be the case, and so our results 
did not support  the labor  hoarding  view. Instead, we found the follow- 
ing. Some plants  followed a pattern  that was consistent with increasing 
returns  over a ten-year time horizon. They experienced either output 
and  input  growth  and  productivity  increases  or they suffered  output  and 
input  decline and productivity  declines. These plants also experienced 
large short-term  declines in productivity during recession years. In 
other words, the hypothesis that these plants have increasing  returns 
would  help explain  not only their  ten-year  changes, but also their  cycli- 
cal changes. 
I stress that these results are very preliminary  and that they only 
apply to manufacturing.  I started out with a prior belief that labor 
hoarding  is important  and I have not lost this prior. But for what it is 314  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
worth,  these plant-level  results  are consistent with the view that if a re- 
covery is weak, then a smaller  fraction  of any observed increase  in pro- 
ductivity should be assigned to the cyclical bounceback  and a larger 
fraction  to the underlying  trend.  These results, therefore,  make  me a lit- 
tle more  optimistic  about  productivity  growth  over the next few years. 
So where do I end up?  Gordon  is correct  that  the recent  productivity 
data  taken  by themselves  fail to provide  clear  evidence of an increase  in 
the productivity  trend, or at least evidence of anything  more than the 
pickup  that  would  be expected, given the way output  is measured.  False 
optimism has followed the last two recessions, so the cautious poli- 
cymaker  today should  not base policy decisions on the assumption  that 
the trend  has improved.  My advice would be to assume the worst and 
then wait and see. 
Despite this, I remain  somewhat  optimistic  about  the future.  Nothing 
in the current data refutes the hypothesis of improved productivity 
growth  and there are some reasons to expect improvements  to occur- 
particularly  evidence of changes  underway  in the service sector. I look 
forward  to finding  out over the next several years what these changes 
really  amount  to. 
General Discussion 
Part  of the discussion  focused on whether  the end-of-expansion  effect 
identified  by Robert  Gordon  was caused by firms'  overhiring  of labor. 
James Tobin proposed  a model that would yield similar  effects but did 
not rely on theories  of overhiring.  In this model, firms  operate  below the 
production  function  during  downturns  in the business cycle. After the 
trough, output may increase without corresponding  increases in labor 
input. The higher productivity achieved could be seen as firms' re- 
turning  to the production  frontier,  and not as the aftermath  of overhir- 
ing. In a related  vein, Tobin  noted that  the last expansion  had  peaked  in 
the first  quarter  of 1989  on a GNP-gap  basis, so that  firms  have had  a long 
time  in which  to shed  labor.  By now, it is unlikely  that  much  excess labor 
would remain. Consequently, a productivity  surprise now was more 
likely  to reflect  a change  in the level or trend  of productivity,  rather  than 
a purely  cyclical upswing. 
Other  participants  accepted the descriptive  hypothesis  of overhiring Robert J. Gordon  315 
advanced by Gordon, but asked for a better explanation  of it. Henry 
Aaron  suggested  a need for a model of expectations  formation  by firms 
to explain the overhiring  phenomenon. Christopher  Carroll  proposed 
that overhiring  at the end of expansionary  periods was not necessarily 
irrational  because firms  are not able to identify the start of recessions 
accurately.  He pointed  to 1966-67  and 1985-86  as examples of periods 
when recessions did not develop after  periods  of slowing  growth.  While 
Robert  Hall felt that this was a side issue to the subject  of the paper,  he 
proposed  that  one could  test for irrationality  based  on published  or econ- 
ometric  forecasts. Gordon  replied  that  he remained  neutral  on the issue 
of whether  firms  were rational  or not in their hiring  policies. However, 
he reported that his attempts to build an autoregressive  forecasting 
model that replicated the end-of-expansion  effect had been unsuc- 
cessful. 
Both Robert Hall and Charles Schultze commented  that it was too 
early to make any definitive  statements  about  productivity  trends  after 
the last recession, despite evidence of an initial  productivity  surprise. 
Benjamin  Friedman  welcomed Gordon's  cautioning  against  premature 
prophecies  of new eras of productivity  growth  that have accompanied 
previous  recoveries, such as in 1984.  Daniel  Sichel suggested  examining 
measures  of wages and  prices  as another  way of testing  whether  a recent 
productivity  surprise  has occurred.  However, Gordon  pointed  out that 
typically only 20 percent of a productivity  improvement  shows up as 
lower inflation;  the rest results in higher  profits. Hence a productivity 
surprise  would  not be readily  detected in prices. 
Gordon  said that he put more weight than Martin  Baily on the long- 
run view of productivity  changes, which Baily dubbed  the Nordhaus- 
depletion  view. According  to this view, what  is surprising  is not the slow 
productivity  growth  in the last twenty years, but rather  the exception- 
ally high growth  between the 1920s  and 1960s.  Before this period, pro- 
ductivity  growth  rates  were below those measured  in recent  years. Gor- 
don also commented  on the implication  of the argument  by J. Bradford 
De Long and Lawrence Summers  in BPEA, 2:1992  that there is a large 
social return on equipment investment. Gordon pointed out that, if 
equipment  were seen as the only type of capital  that produces output, 
then calculations of multifactor  productivity growth for the United 
States would show zero or negative  growth. 316  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
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